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need. On the other hand, a $1 tax credit does not
sell for $1, but the credit costs the taxpayers of
Missouri that amount when it is redeemed. Trans-
ferability therefore adds an extra dimension of
costs and benefits to a tax credit.
Of the 53 tax credit programs mentioned above,
30 have credits that were officially designated as
transferable (57 percent); and of the 32 programs we
know actually issued credits in 2005, 17 issued
transferable credits (53 percent). Transferability
does not necessarily mean that one can sell the
credits on e-Bay to the highest bidder, however. The
state classifies tax credits as transferable or not, but
the degree of transferability can be determined only
by reading the authorizing legislation. Because it
would not be practical to examine all of these pro-
grams, we focus mostly on the six largest programs
(by value of credits issued in 2005) that issued what
we consider to be “freely” transferable credits.
I
n 2005, the state of Missouri had 53 legally
authorized tax credit programs. At least 32
(and at most 38) actually issued credits in
that year. The value of the credits issued was
at least $357 million dollars. This is a large num-
ber of programs, and the amount of tax revenue
forgone is significant. The revenue is only a mod-
est share of total state general revenue, however,
about 5 percent.
An interesting feature of many Missouri tax
credits is that they are to some degree transferable.
Transferability allows an entity that has more tax
credits than tax liability to sell what he or she
cannot use. It therefore makes the credit useful to
entities that have little or no state tax liability, so
tax policy becomes a closer substitute for expen-
diture policy. Transferability also allows entities
that receive multiyear credits for capital projects
to sell the credits and obtain the financing they
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is whether each program is good public policy. We
take this question to mean, in the broadest possible
terms, is there something inefficient or unfair about
the outcomes that would result if the program did
not exist? We provide a general discussion of this
question for each of the six largest tax credit pro-
grams (by number of credits issued) that have freely
transferable credits. In doing this, we draw on
current research in local public-sector economics
and basic economic principles. Given the difficulty
of the question and the limited amount of infor-
mation available about these programs, however,
we decided not to overly simplify matters just to
provide “yes” or “no” answers.
We begin our analysis by identifying and
describing the six largest programs. We then exam-
ine the way these programs are evaluated by the
Missouri Department of Economic Development
(DED), which has the formal responsibility for
reviewing them. A necessary condition for good
public policy is strong and regular administrative
review. It is therefore appropriate to consider how
these reviews help analyze the policies themselves.
We also consider three recent reviews of the pro-
grams that were not done by DED.
We then turn to our basic question. If there is
something inefficient about the outcomes that
would occur or if growth would be slower if a pro-
gram did not exist, then we should be able to iden-
tify a market failure that the program addresses.
If there is something unfair about the outcomes
that would occur if a program did not exist, then
we should be able to identify the disparities or
inequities that the program addresses. Thus, our
basic question leads us to ask whether the program
in question addresses some kind of market failure
or corrects disparities or inequities. Furthermore,
the answers to these questions provide some insight
into how the program should be structured, how
its key parameters should be chosen, and what
variables should be measured to evaluate it. One
can quantify the impact of a program in any number
of ways (jobs created, services delivered, output
produced, etc.). One cannot draw meaningful con-
clusions from these numbers unless the rationale
for the program is clear.
In our conversations with various officials, we
found general dissatisfaction with the fact that DED
evaluates every program as if its purpose were
economic development. This is DED’s job, how-
ever, so the criticism is not really of DED but its
mandate. In doing what is expected of them, they
ignore the distinctions between correcting market
failures, reducing disparities, and promoting eco-
nomic development. These are different goals, they
imply different structural features for the programs,
and they require the measurement of somewhat
different variables for proper program evaluation.
In many cases, DED’s approach forces a stark mis-
match between their analysis and the analysis
suggested by economic theory.
An additional matter for concern is simply
how little analysis is actually being done. DED
tends to produce lists of raw information about
the impact of each program. In particular, they
make no attempt to produce a single, bottom-line
number of all the tangible benefits and costs for
each program. By tangible program benefits and
costs, we mean simply those impacts that can be
plausibly converted into dollars and cents. Failing
to quantify these impacts (to the greatest extent
possible) is an enormous problem. There are always
important intangible benefits and costs, as well—
the highly subjective aspects of programs that pre-
serve state history, reduce poverty, and promote
opportunity, and which may also interfere with
property rights or reduce incentives to work. Con-
crete information about tangible benefits and costs
is essential for having a rational debate over these
intangible benefits and costs.
The next sections provide preliminary infor-
mation about the programs, discuss the program
evaluations done by DED and others, present our
analysis of the programs, and then consider briefly
whether making the tax credits refundable in
addition to transferable would improve their cost
effectiveness.
AN OVERVIEW OF MISSOURI TAX
CREDIT PROGRAMS
We begin our analysis of Missouri transferable
tax credit programs by placing them in the larger
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the size of Missouri’s government. First, tax credit
programs are a popular policy tool in Missouri and
most tax credits are in fact transferable. The credits
cause the state to forgo a significant amount of
revenue in absolute terms. They cause just a modest
loss as a share of all general revenue, though.
Lists of the tax credit programs in any year are
available from two sources. The better-known is
form MO-TC, which is issued by the Missouri
Department of Revenue (DOR). This form lists the
tax credits that DOR has some role in administering
(44 in all).
A second list of tax credits appears as part of
the budget instructions issued to Missouri’s govern-
mental departments by the Office of Administration.
This list includes tax credits that DOR has no role
in administering, but it also includes other kinds
of tax preferences.1
By using these lists and making inquiries at
the relevant government agencies, we developed a
spreadsheet with 53 tax credit programs for 2005.
(See the appendix.) We have complete information
for almost every program, but there are a few key
omissions.
We regard the value of tax credits issued under
a particular program in a given year as a good meas-
ure of the “importance” of the program in that year.
This number reflects economic demand for the
credits, which is the quantity (in dollars) that
people want to acquire on existing terms.2 We also
say that a program is “active” in a given year if it
issued any credits at all.
A brief glance at the appendix shows that, in
2005, many programs were inactive.3 Thus, the
total number of programs is not really a good indi-
cator of the aggregate importance of tax credits in
Missouri. A more careful review of the data gives
the following basic results:
• Between 32 and 38 tax credit programs were
active in 2005. We cannot state the exact
number because of the lack of data for six
programs.
• The value of credits issued by the 32 active
programs for which we have data was about
$357 million dollars.
• Of these 32 programs, 17 issued credits
designated as “transferable.”4
• The value of the credits issued by these 17
programs was about $266 million dollars.
This is 74 percent of the total value of the
credits issued by the 32 active programs for
which we have data.5
On the one hand, $357 million is a significant
sum. On the other, in 2005, the Missouri state gov-
ernment reported about $6.933 billion in general
revenue.6 If the revenues forgone from the 32 pro-
grams could have been collected without changing
any other figures, general revenue would have been
about 5 percent higher. Gathering this revenue
would not have increased Missouri’s ranking of




In this section, we explain our selection of the
six transferable tax credit programs, which we
examine in detail. We find that all of these programs
are primarily administered by the DED and appear
on form MO-TC.
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1 The list is available at www.oa.mo.gov/bp/budget.htm
(“Attachment 8”).
2 Strictly speaking, this is true only if the amount actually issued is
strictly less than the amount that could have been issued in that
year. This was generally, but not always, the case.
3 Zeros in the spreadsheet are the actual values. Missing data is indi-
cated by “N/A.”
4 This does not mean the same thing in all cases, however. Two
important programs, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program
and the Certified Capital Companies Program, issue transferable
credits that are not “freely” transferable. We will discuss this further
later in the paper.
5 If we exclude credits issued under the Low Income Housing Tax
Credits Program and the Certified Capital Companies Program, we
still find that 47 percent of all credits issued are transferable.
6 This is revenue apart from the earnings of utilities and certain other
operations.
7 The state ranking is for 2004, the most recent year for which the
data is available; see The Tax Foundation, www.taxfoundation.org/.
These figures do not include credits issued by the six programs for
which we do not have data.Table 1 comes from data in the appendix. We
sorted the data by the amount of tax credits issued
and extracted those programs issuing more than
$5 million in credits. This gives us 14 programs.
Of the 14, eight are designated as “transferable.”
This does not mean the same thing in all cases,
however. In particular, two of the eight programs
are subject to special restrictions. For example, the
Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program follows
federal rules. These require an entity using the
credit to have an ownership interest in a housing
project. Thus, it is not enough just to have Missouri
tax liability. One cannot simply auction the credits
to the highest bidder.
Similarly, the Certified Capital Companies
Program follows rules specified by the DED: Rule
4 CSR 80-7.040(G) states that tax credits may be
sold only to insurance companies. Again, one can-
not simply sell the credits to the highest bidder.
In contrast, the statutes for the remaining six
tax credits define relatively free markets for those
credits. These six transferable tax credit programs
are indicated in bold in Table 1, and they are the
focus of our analysis.
BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS OF THE
SIX PROGRAMS
8
In this section we briefly describe the six pro-
grams: We give a short statement of (i) what each
credit is for, (ii) whether the credit is awarded at
the discretion of the DED or is an entitlement to
any entity that meets the statutory criteria, (iii) the
taxes against which it can be applied, (iv) whether
there are carry-back and carry-forward provisions,
(v) and any special statutory language about trans-
ferability.
Historic Preservation Tax Credit Program
• The credit is given for 25 percent of the qual-
ifying expenses incurred in the rehabilitation
of an approved historic structure. The total
costs of the rehabilitation must be more than
half of the acquisition cost of the property.
• The credit is an entitlement.
Rothstein and Wineinger
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Table 1
Tax Credit Programs Issuing Over $5 Million in Credits (FY 2005)
Tax credit program Transferable Amount issued
Missouri Low Income Housing Tax Credit Yes $83,477,412
Historic Preservation Tax Credit Program Yes 80,213,374
Enterprise Zone Tax Benefit Program No 39,066,023
Infrastructure Tax Credit Program Yes 28,964,274
Brownfield Redevelopment Program (remediation) Yes 14,808,297
Certified Capital Companies Program (CAPCO) Yes 14,000,000
Neighborhood Assistance Tax Credit Program No 11,263,385
Missouri Health Insurance Pool No 10,015,203
Affordable Housing Assistance Tax Credit Program Yes 9,133,829
New and Expanded Business Facility Credit Yes 8,779,797
Missouri Business Use Incentives for Large-Scale Development (BUILD) No 8,419,707
Examination Fee Tax Credits No 7,576,530
Missouri Property and Casualty Guaranty Association No 7,227,710
Neighborhood Preservation Tax Credit Yes 6,784,310
NOTE: Bold typeface indicates the six programs with freely transferable credits.
8 This information comes from DED (2005 and 2006) and the relevant
statutes.• The credits can be applied to the following
taxes: income (excluding withholding), bank,
insurance premium, and other financial
institution.
• There is a carry-back of 3 years and a carry-
forward of 10 years.9
• By statute the credits cannot be issued to
nonprofit entities, but they can buy and sell
them.10
Infrastructure Tax Credit Program
• The credit is equal to 50 percent of a contri-
bution made to local governments or state
agencies to finance the development of pub-
licly owned essential public purpose infra-
structure such as water, sewer, gas, electrical
systems, streets, bridges, rail spurs, storm
water drainage, and other projects.
• The credit is discretionary.
• The credits can be applied to the following
taxes: income (excluding withholding),
corporate franchise, bank, and insurance
premium.
• There is a carry-forward of 5 years.
• By statute, the credits must transact at
between 75 and 100 percent per dollar of
credit. There is also an explicit stipulation
that the seller of the credits must report the
payment received from the buyer as taxable
income and that the buyer must recognize
the difference between the face value and
his payment to the seller as taxable income.
Brownfield Redevelopment Tax Credit
Program (Remediation)
• The tax credit is worth up to 100 percent of
the costs of cleaning contaminated commer-
cial or industrial sites that have been under-
utilized for at least 3 years. The project must
retain 25 jobs or create 10 new jobs; if the
property is privately owned, a city or county
government must endorse the project; and
all projects must be accepted into the state’s
Voluntary Cleanup Program.
• The credit is discretionary.
• The credits can be applied to the following
taxes: income (excluding withholding), cor-
porate franchise, bank, insurance premium,
and other financial institution.
• There is a carry-forward of 20 years.
Affordable Housing Assistance Tax
Credit Program
• The credit is equal to 55 percent of a contri-
bution made to a nonprofit housing organi-
zation. The contribution must be used for the
building, procurement, rehabilitation, and
in some cases basic operating expenses of a
housing organization that provides certain
types of housing, either affordable (targeted
toward persons below 50 percent of median
income) or market rate (targeted toward
“rebuilding communities” as defined by
statute).
• The credit is discretionary.
• The credits can be applied to the following
taxes: income, corporate franchise, bank,
insurance premium, other financial institu-
tion, and express company.
• There is a carry-forward of 10 years.
New and Expanded Business Facility
Tax Credit Program
• Tax credits are awarded during a 10-year
window based on capital invested in new
facilities and the creation of new jobs.
Facilities must belong to certain industries,
including manufacturing, research and
development, and computer-related services.
The credit amount varies depending on
whether the facility is owned by an existing
Missouri company or a new company and
whether the facility is in a distressed area or
not. The program is being phased out, but
Rothstein and Wineinger
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9 A carry-back of three years allows a taxpayer whose tax credits
exceed his current tax liability to use the excess to offset tax liability
from the three previous years. This presumably generates a refund
from the state if the taxpayer is not in arrears.
10 We confirmed this last point with the DED.credits could potentially be issued through
2014.11
• The credit is an entitlement.
• The credits can be applied to the following
taxes: income (excluding withholding),
insurance premium, and insurance company
retaliatory.
• There is no carry-forward for the recipient
(but see the next bullet point).
• Regarding transferability, the statutory lan-
guage is similar to that for the infrastructure
tax credit program. The credits must transact
at between 75 percent and 100 percent per
dollar of credit. There is an explicit stipula-
tion that the seller of the credits must report
the payment received from the buyer as tax-
able income, and the buyer must recognize
the difference between the face value and
his payment as taxable income.
Neighborhood Preservation Tax Credit
Program
• This tax credit is worth a minimum of 15
percent and maximum of 35 percent of eligi-
ble expenses for new construction or reha-
bilitation of owner-occupied homes incurred
in communities with median household
incomes that are low for their metropolitan
statistical area.
• The credit is an entitlement.
• The credits can be applied to the following
taxes: income (excluding withholding), cor-
porate franchise, bank, insurance premium,
and other financial institution.
• There is a carry-back of 3 years and a carry-
forward of 5 years.
• There is an explicit statement that the credit
cannot be claimed in addition to any other
state tax credits.
THE SCOPE OF THE DED’S
PROGRAM EVALUATIONS
The tax credit analysis form issued by the
Missouri Office of Administration states the
following:
Per 33.282.2 RSMo, each department author-
ized to offer deductions, exemptions, credits or
other tax preferences shall submit the estimated
amount of such tax expenditures for the fiscal
year beginning July 1st of the following year and
a cost/benefit analysis of such tax expenditures
for the preceding fiscal year.
Pursuant to this, the DED performs an annual
analysis of the tax credits that it administers.
Table 2 compiles DED data on fiscal costs and
benefits for our six programs for 3 consecutive
years. In other words, all of the reported costs and
benefits, whether direct, indirect, current-year, or
long-run, are simply state tax revenues that are
lost or gained as a result of the programs.
Four features of the data are worth noting:
• The data on fiscal costs and benefits in the
2005 report is more complete than that in
the previous two reports.
• The direct cost, total cost, and tax credits
redeemed for each program are generally all
equal. In other words, the DED measures
program costs by the tax credits redeemed.
This may be generally reasonable, but over
the long run economic development credits
(such as the infrastructure and business
facility credits) create additional fiscal costs,
for example, through demand for additional
government services.
• Using FY 2005 data, DED forecasts fiscal
net losses in the long run (from the credits
granted in 2005) for the tax credit programs
for historic preservation, affordable housing,
and neighborhood preservation. These pro-
grams also generate net losses in the short
run.
• Two additional programs, for infrastructure
and brownfield redevelopment, generate
net losses in the short run (but net benefits
Rothstein and Wineinger
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11 Only facilities that applied for the credit on or before December 16,
2004, and began operations on or before that date are eligible. In
each year in the 10-year window in which at least $100,000 in new
capital is invested (or $1,000,000 in replacement facilities) and two
new jobs are created (25 for office jobs), an existing Missouri com-
pany receives a credit of $100 ($150 in distressed areas) per new job
and a new Missouri company a credit of $75 ($125 in distressed
areas) per new job.Rothstein and Wineinger
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.in the long run). Only the business facility
credit generates net benefits in both the
short and long run.
Regarding tangible nonfiscal costs and benefits,
DED produces a range of information on the impact
of each program in the short and long run. For
illustration, Table 3 presents the long-run increase
in personal income for every dollar of redeemed
credits in 2005.12
From an economic perspective, there are two
basic problems with the way DED evaluates the tax
credit programs. First, DED regards each program
as if its purpose were economic development (i.e.,
to create faster growth or more jobs than would
occur otherwise). This is not true, however, because
some of these programs are more likely to correct
market failures or reduce economic disparities
than promote development. These different goals
imply different structural features for the programs
and require the measurement of somewhat different
variables for proper program evaluation. We discuss
these points in greater detail in the section on pro-
gram design and evaluation. In many cases, DED’s
focus on development forces a stark mismatch
between its analysis and the analysis suggested by
economic theory.
A second problem comes from DED’s tendency
to produce lists of raw information, like that in
Table 3. Although this information should certainly
be reported, lists of facts about impact are not a
substitute for a single, bottom-line number of all
the tangible benefits and costs for each program.
By tangible program benefits and costs, we mean
simply those impacts that can be plausibly con-
verted into dollars and cents. Public policies often
have important intangible benefits and costs. These
highly subjective items are key components of
policies that preserve state history, reduce poverty,
and promote opportunity, but may also interfere
with property rights or reduce the incentive to
work. Concrete information about tangible benefits
and costs is essential for having an informed debate
over intangible benefits and costs. Economic
analysis cannot remove the subjective element in
program evaluation. It can, however, narrow it
substantially. Lists of raw data do not do this.13
OTHER EVALUATIONS OF THE
PROGRAMS AND OF DED
We found three recent evaluations of the
Missouri tax credit programs besides those done
by DED. We present a brief discussion of each.
The State Auditor’s Report
In February 2001, the Missouri state auditor
issued a report entitled, “Review of the State Tax
Credits Administered by the Department of
Economic Development” (Office of the State
Auditor of Missouri, Claire McCaskill, 2001). For
our purposes, the report makes three points worth
noting.
First, the report is very critical of data collec-
tion at DED. The accuracy of the collected data is
one concern, but the report focuses more sharply
on omissions in data collection:
Key data such as number of actual jobs created
per project, average wages, total investment,
industry sectors affected, street addresses for the
projects and other relevant information are not
Rothstein and Wineinger
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Table 3
Reported Impact of $1 of Redeemed FY 2005
Tax Credits on Personal Income (over 5 or
12 years)
New







NOTE: *Indicates 5 years; **indicates 12 years.
12 This is clearly the total effect over the given time period and not the
average annual effect over the time period. We do not know whether
DED uses a discount rate in computing the total effect.
13 For an excellent example of one way to produce a single measure of
all tangible costs and benefits, see Bartik (2005).captured in a centralized management infor-
mation system and in some cases are not cap-
tured at all. (p. 2)
Data is not maintained or monitored for 16 of
33 tax credit programs. These 16 programs are
formula-based tax credits, which are granted if
the project meets the eligibility requirements
set out in the authorizing statute. Department
of Economic Development management stated
that it is not the responsibility of the agency to
monitor the economic impact that formula-based
tax credits have on the state because they have
no discretion over whether projects qualifying
for the tax credit receive the tax credit. (p. 7)
Second, the report is very critical of “cost-
benefit analysis.” It is not entirely consistent in its
use of this term, but the intent is clear:
A former economist for the Department of
Economic Development, who was the former
Manager and Senior Economist for Office of
Research and Policy Analysis, said that he has
read a lot of the economic literature and attended
numerous national conferences and has come
to the conclusion that no one knows how to per-
form a useful cost-benefit analysis of tax credit
programs. (p. 4-5)
This comment, while not entirely without
foundation, is presented as a definitive statement
about a fundamental limit of economic analysis.
We think it more accurately reflects something else.
One cannot perform a meaningful cost-benefit
analysis of tax credit programs by treating all of
them as if they were economic development pro-
grams. Some programs address market failures
and others address disparities and inequities. Only
some are supposed to promote economic develop-
ment. One can use cost-benefit analysis in all cases,
but one must measure different variables depend-
ing on the purpose of the program. Ignoring these
differences and reviewing non-development cred-
its as if they were development credits is an inco-
herent exercise. It should not be surprising that no
one knows how to do it.
The auditor concludes by calling for an
“impact analysis” of each program. She had her
staff analyze four of the smaller tax credit programs.
In each case she used DED’s regional forecasting
model to consider the impact of the tax credits
issued on state revenues, employment, wages, and
gross state product. To make the simulation inter-
nally consistent, she assumed that government
spending would fall by the amount of the tax credits
redeemed. She also sent surveys to recipients of
the tax credits, asking if the credits were essential
to their decision to make their investments.14
The impact analysis conducted by the auditor
was a step in the right direction in 2001. It is now
conducted by DED for all its tax credit programs,
and the results are presented in its annual report.15
Don Phares’s Report
Don Phares (2003) of the University of Missouri
at St. Louis produced a report for the Department
of Revenue entitled, “Examining Missouri’s Tax
System: Tax Expenditures—A First Step.”16
The term “tax expenditures” in the title is very
general. It encompasses all exceptions to general
tax rules that result in less tax liability for some
entity. Tax credits are one kind of tax expenditure.
Professor Phares echoes the auditor’s call for
more data collection, noting the progress DED made
in evaluating the programs under its discretion;
he adds, however, that “proper evaluation would
allow the extent to which [the credits] meet their
intended purpose to be addressed” (p. 13). This
refrain is likely to be repeated into the indefinite
future, until such time as (i) it is recognized that
the intended purpose may be to address some
kind of market failure or to correct disparities and
inequities and not merely to promote economic
development, (ii) key program parameters are
Rothstein and Wineinger
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14 Asking the recipients of the tax credits if the credits were essential
to their decisions is a highly problematic exercise. The recipients
have their own agendas, and they may answer these questions in
pursuit of those agendas. This may not entail giving a thoughtful or
candid answer to a direct question. One of the purposes of social
science and nonexperimental statistics is to provide methods for
learning about the causes of choices without relying on answers to
these kinds of questions. Furthermore, while the auditor is certainly
right that the only way to answer the question with “absolute cer-
tainty” in each case is to know the subjective thoughts of the project
managers (p. 19), a “statistical certainty” is often enough for policy
purposes.
15 We were told that DED does try to determine for the discretionary
programs whether the credits are essential to the investment decisions.
16 The report contains references to other evaluations of Missouri tax
credits that we do not discuss here.chosen in ways that are consistent with each pro-
gram’s rationale, and (iii) each program is evaluated
in ways that are consistent with its rationale.
Incentives Review Committee Report
The most recent report on tax credit programs
in Missouri was undertaken by the Incentives
Review Committee of the Missouri Department
of Economic Development (2005), pursuant to a
request by Governor Matt Blunt. It has the efficient
title, “Report on Missouri Incentives Programs.”
This report is excellent in two respects. First,
it pays careful attention to the different purposes
of each program. Second, it recommends evalua-
tion criteria that bear some connection to these
purposes. This makes an interesting contrast with
the auditor’s report on the issue of (broad) cost-
benefit analysis. Indeed, its two pages of criteria
for program evaluation really go beyond cost-
benefit analysis and include objectives such as
transparency and low transactions costs (although
it uses different language). The committee then
provides a brief evaluation of each program and
a recommendation to “improve,” “combine,”
“delete,” or “maintain” the program.
Unfortunately, it is not clear how rigorously
the committee used these criteria in developing
their evaluations and recommendations. The
report gives only a brief discussion of each program
and provides little explanation for its conclusions.
Furthermore, implementing these criteria would
have required extraordinary amounts of money,
time, data, and expertise. Even with those, the
analysts would have needed to conjecture about
missing information and poorly understood behav-
ioral responses. This would have necessitated a
sensitivity analysis to determine how the conclu-
sions depended on the assumptions. If the authors
did these things, they do not mention them in the
report.
We report in Table 4 the recommendations in
the report for our six programs.
The only recommendation for change is for
the neighborhood preservation credit. The authors
note that
[t]he program is based on a first-come allocation
and the demand is significantly more than the
annual allocation. As such, the distribution of
funding has been on a lottery basis, which does
not provide for a concentrated redevelopment
impact. Also, some areas in the city-wide dis-
tressed areas are not lower income. (p. 40)
Their recommendation for improvement is to
[e]nact legislation to award funds on a competi-
tive basis, requiring a comprehensive neighbor-
hood redevelopment plan. (p. 40)
PROGRAM DESIGN AND
PROGRAM EVALUATION
Are Missouri’s tax credit programs good public
policy? We take this question to mean, in the broad-
est possible terms, is there something inefficient
or unfair about the outcomes that would result if
the program did not exist? We provide a general
discussion of this question for each of the six largest
tax credit programs (by number of credits issued)
that have freely transferable credits. In doing this,
we draw on current research in local public-sector
economics and basic economic principles. Given
the difficulty of the question and the limited amount
of information available about these programs,
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Table 4
Recommendations of the Incentives Review
Committee







Business facility (Not evaluated)
19
Neighborhood preservation Improve
17 This is listed in the report as the “MDFB Contribution Credit.”
18 The summary table at the front of the report recommends “combine,”
but in the discussion of the program the recommendation is “main-
tain.” The former appears to be an editing error.
19 This program is being phased out, as noted in the section that pro-
vides brief descriptions of these programs.however, we decided not to overly simplify matters
just to provide “yes” or “no” answers.
Although our analysis is qualitative and not
quantitative, we must still keep a specific thought
experiment in mind to evaluate the programs con-
sistently. Following standard practice in the eval-
uation of tax policy, the initial assumption is that
the tax credit program does not exist and the state
budget is balanced. The tax credit is then intro-
duced. This creates a shortfall in revenue that must
be met either by a reduction in spending or an
increase in other taxes: We generally consider both
cases. These changes taken together have equity
and efficiency implications.
Historic Preservation Tax Credit Program
Recall our basic question in the context of this
program. This tax credit causes Missouri to have
more historic structures than market forces alone
would provide. Is there something inefficient or
unfair about this?
The main reason that the market may fail here
is that historic structures provide benefits to more
people than just the owners of the structures. For
example, the structures may enhance local property
values or generate local tourism. These benefit
many non-owners. In the formal language of eco-
nomics, the market for historic structures does not
capture the “willingness to pay” of all the benefi-
ciaries, who receive a “positive externality.” The
result is that too few structures are preserved. This
simple point has useful implications for program
design and evaluation.
First, an efficient program must have a care-
fully chosen subsidy rate. This rate should induce
additional preservation activity up to the point
where the total additional benefits from this activity
(higher property values, tourism, etc.) exactly bal-
ance the total additional cost. These costs would
include the “true” cost of the subsidy itself. This
could well be more than the dollar value of the
subsidy, both because raising revenue is costly and
because any state services forgone to fund the sub-
sidy may be worth more than their simple dollar
value. We have no way to determine whether the
current 25 percent subsidy rate is proper according
to these economic criteria.20
Second, even if the policy were well designed,
it would never pass a cost-benefit test that sums up
only fiscal costs and benefits (i.e., state tax revenues
that are lost or gained). This is true at the current
subsidy rate and should also be true at the proper
subsidy rate, given the highly indirect links between
historic preservation activities and state tax rev-
enues. The policy should, however, pass a cost-
benefit test that sums up all tangible costs and
benefits. As noted above, these benefits would
include the willingness to pay of all the benefici-
aries of the program. Also as noted above, a bottom-
line estimate of all the tangible net benefits would
allow citizens and legislators to debate, in a struc-
tured (albeit subjective) way, the intangible aspects
of the program.
Finally, we note that the program is an entitle-
ment. Entitlement tax credits, in contrast to dis-
cretionary credits, are often criticized because they
probably give more money for activities that would
have been undertaken anyway.21 To the extent this
occurs, the program is redistributing income from
one group of taxpayers (those who fund the subsidy
or lose government benefits) to another (those who
engage in preservation activities). This may not be
entirely bad, however. If the subsidy is funded by
higher taxes and some of those taxpayers receive
positive externalities from historic structures, then
they are now simply paying for something that
they previously enjoyed for free.
More generally, one should not overreact to the
incidental income transfers that will always be part
of simple market solutions to market failures. The
alternative is to make the tax credit discretionary,
but this would certainly lead to higher administra-
tive costs. There is a trade-off between incidental
redistribution and administrative costs that should
not be forgotten and which may not be small.
Infrastructure Tax Credit Program
This program allows local communities to
have more and better public infrastructure than
they would otherwise have. Again we ask, Is there
20 Note that these criteria have nothing to do with economic
development.
21 Entitlement credits also tend to be reviewed less carefully. This is a
separate issue that is emphasized in Bartik (2005).
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of infrastructure in different communities that
market forces alone would provide?
Regarding efficiency, there is a large literature
in economics on the question of whether there is a
“race to the bottom” in the funding of public infra-
structure. The idea is that jurisdictions (commu-
nities, states, and even countries) compete with
each other for investment and workers by cutting
taxes. The question is whether taxes can be cut so
far that even basic infrastructure that all residents
desire will not be provided. If so, then an infra-
structure tax credit program may enhance efficiency
by allowing communities to finance the proper
amounts of infrastructure despite the race to the
bottom.
Whether or not a race to the bottom occurs
depends on a number of factors. These include
whether communities have the appropriate tax
instruments at their disposal, whether there is a
large or small number of communities, who owns
the land and other spatially fixed inputs to produc-
tion, the objectives of the local government, and
the time frame of the analysis (short run or long
run). We think it is fair to say that, except for the
very long run, the consensus in the literature is
that in the real world there is quite likely to be a
race to the bottom in tax cuts and therefore in the
funding of public infrastructure.22
Given that a race to the bottom tends to exist,
the recommendations of economic theory for pro-
gram design and evaluation are similar to the recom-
mendations for the historic preservation program.
The program should subsidize local spending with
a carefully chosen subsidy rate. This rate should
be selected so that each jurisdiction, acting in a
decentralized way, chooses the proper quantity of
infrastructure. It can be shown that this essentially
requires a subsidy rate equal to the tax revenue
each region fears it would lose if it increased its
own tax rate (from the rate it would choose with-
out the tax credit program). With this subsidy, the
quantity of infrastructure would be such that any
further increase in infrastructure would generate
only as much consumption as would be foregone
to pay for that increase.
Recall that the actual program does not subsi-
dize the local tax rate; rather, it funds $1 of infra-
structure through a 50 cent donation from private
citizens and (presumably) a 50 cent reduction in
state services. Because the structure of this program
is so far removed from the basic economic incen-
tives that an efficient program would take into
account, it is difficult to evaluate. Given that a mar-
ket failure exists, the program may well be better
than nothing, but that is a low bar to surmount.
Finally, we note that, as with the historic
preservation program, even a well-designed infra-
structure credit program would never pass a cost-
benefit test that sums up only fiscal costs and
benefits. There would be little or no connection
between the fiscal cost of the proper subsidy and
any extra revenues the state would receive from
any extra infrastructure attributable to the program.
The policy should, however, pass a cost-benefit
test that sums up all tangible costs and benefits.
Brownfield Redevelopment Tax Credit
Program (Remediation)
This program causes Missouri to have fewer
commercial/industrial sites with hazardous sub-
stances than market forces alone would allow. Is
there something inefficient or unfair about the
latter? After all, if land in a certain area becomes
scarce enough, then eventually even brownfields
will find buyers.
The problem with brownfields, of course, is
the problem of negative externalities. Brownfields
are ugly, they present various hazards (for example,
to ground water), and they deter development
somewhat beyond their immediate boundaries.
The externalities presumably differ wildly depend-
ing on the type of hazardous waste involved and
its proximity to different communities. This line
of thought leads to the same kind of conclusions
as have been drawn for the previous two programs,
with one major exception. The huge variation in
external damages at different locations provides
an economic rationale for making the program
discretionary, which it is.
Unfortunately, if this is the right perspective
on this program, then another feature of its design
22 The literature is large, but the key papers on which this conclusion
is based are by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wildasin (1989),
and Myers (1990).
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100 percent of the costs of cleanup, but only when
a third party, a commercial developer, is interested
in the site. This is very odd. If a brownfield is creat-
ing large enough negative externalities that citizens
are willing to pay 100 percent of the costs to clean
it up, then one should expect them to raise the
funds and do so. The broad-based taxes they would
generally use are not ideal for this purpose, but
they are practical and they work. We therefore
expect most brownfields to exist where citizens’
willingness to pay is less than the cost of cleanup.
This makes it efficient to wait until a third party—
the developer—has a willingness to pay to make
up the difference. However, because the developer
does not pay anything for the cleanup, it is unlikely
that his willingness to pay does make up the dif-
ference. The developer’s interest is simply an
expressed desire to have something when other
people pay for it. If citizens’ and the developer’s
total willingness to pay is less than the actual cost
of the cleanup, then the cleanup is inefficient. It is
also arguably unfair to have the taxpayers pay the
full cost.
Affordable Housing Assistance Tax Credit
Program
This program is obviously intended to be
redistributive. One must recognize this fact to
properly evaluate the program. An efficiency issue
is also present, however. We discuss this first.
Affordable housing policy in one state always
raises the question of whether it may lead people
from other states to move to the more generous
state. This is a variation on the race to the bottom
discussed under the infrastructure program. Unfor-
tunately, although state action can help overcome
the problems of fiscal competition among local
communities, federal action would be required to
help overcome the problems of fiscal competition
among the states. The movement of low-income
residents in response to differences in benefits
across states has been studied for many years by
all kinds of social scientists. For the purposes of
the analysis here, we assume that these movements
are small. The proper evaluation of this program
by DED would make use of this literature.
In contrast with the historic preservation pro-
gram, this program’s focus on redistribution makes
more central the issue of whether the program
creates housing that would not have been created
otherwise. In other words, it is important to know
if the program merely “crowds out” private spend-
ing on the construction of affordable housing. If
the program is ineffective in this way and funded
by higher taxes, then there is an income transfer
from taxpayers to developers and the poor are most
likely neither harmed nor helped. If the program is
ineffective and funded by reduced state spending in
other areas, then the poor may well be worse off.
It is surely unlikely that an affordable housing
program crowds out for-profit private-sector spend-
ing. It is a fair question, however, whether it crowds
out not-for-profit or philanthropic spending on
affordable housing. If it does, then it is difficult to
see how the poor could be helped, and any reduc-
tions in other programs to fund this program could
be harmful. Again, there is a literature in economics
on this issue, and the proper evaluation of this
program by DED would make use of it.
No purely redistributive program would pass
a cost-benefit test of either fiscal costs and benefits
or tangible costs and benefits. Tangible costs and
benefits would exactly balance if funds could be
raised costlessly and services delivered without
waste; but neither is true. Thus, tangible costs will
always exceed benefits. Again, this makes it impor-
tant to have a single, bottom-line measure of the
tangible net costs of the program. Presenting this
information on, say, a per-beneficiary basis might
allow citizens and legislators to debate, in a struc-
tured way, whether the intangible benefits of hous-
ing assistance are sufficient to offset the costs.
New and Expanded Business Facility
Tax Credit Program
At long last, we come to an economic develop-
ment program. In other words, this program does
not correct a market failure or attempt to redistrib-
ute income to assist the poor. It is an attempt to
create growth that market forces alone would not
provide.23
23 “Missed development opportunities” may result from missing capital
markets or missing insurance markets. These market failures are
qualitatively different from the externalities discussed above, however.
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addressing this question. Even here, however, it is
possible to take the analysis much further than DED
does. A proper evaluation of economic development
programs would have the following steps, of which
the DED does only the first.
1. For all programs, determine the long-run
fiscal benefits and costs.
2. For all programs, determine the other tangible
long-run benefits and costs. Roughly, these
benefits would include the extra earnings of
residents due to improvements in local labor
markets and increases in property values,
while costs would include any extra public
services or infrastructure required.
3. Combine steps 1 and 2 to compute a single,
bottom-line measure of the tangible net
benefits or net costs of each program.
4. Perform sensitivity analysis to remedy the
problems of missing information and poorly
understood behavioral responses, which
affect steps 1 and 2. For step 1, there is uncer-
tainty over how much activity would take
place if not for the credits and uncertainty
over the multiplier effects used to compute
long-run fiscal benefits. For step 2, the bene-
fits and costs of the labor market effects, for
example, are sensitive to whether the new
jobs are going to people who were formerly
unemployed or not.24
The business facility credit raises tax revenue
in the short and long run. The only issue, then, is
whether the costs of additional public services that
come with development could offset the large gains
reported by the state. This seems highly unlikely.
Neighborhood Preservation Tax Credit
Program
The efficiency rationale for this program is
very similar to the rationale for the historic preser-
vation program. Preserving neighborhoods has
benefits to people besides those who buy, sell, and
improve homes in those neighborhoods. We refer
the reader to the discussion of the historic preser-
vation program for the basic analysis.
Finally, recall the recommendation of the
Incentives Review Committee for this program
(see the section on other evaluations of the pro-
grams and of the DED). They argue that redevelop-
ment should be concentrated and the subsidy given
to activities that are part of a redevelopment plan.
This is correct if the external benefits of neighbor-
hood preservation are highly dependent on con-
centrated activity. This seems likely. No similar
recommendation was made for the historic preser-
vation program, but this is a sound position with
regard to efficiency if even somewhat isolated his-
toric structures have external value.
SHOULD THE TRANSFERABLE
CREDITS ALSO BE REFUNDABLE?
We conclude by considering a reform that
would be applicable to all but the business facility
tax credit. None of the other five credits is refund-
able. That is to say, once an entity has offset all of
its tax liability it cannot use the remainder to
receive a refund from the state. The only way an
entity with little or no tax liability (like a nonprofit
organization) can benefit from the tax credits is by
selling them. In contrast, the business facility credit
is refundable and transferable.25
A potential problem with credits that are just
transferable is straightforward: A $1 tax credit does
not sell for $1, but the credit will cost the taxpayers
of Missouri that amount when it is redeemed.
Money that was supposed to support public pro-
grams ends up as profit to the buyer of the credits.
In contrast, if the tax credits were also refundable,
then every tax dollar spent on the tax credit would
go toward the intended activity.
24 This is emphasized in Bartik (2005).
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25 The refundability and transferability of the business facility credit
are somewhat constrained, however. Missouri Revised Statutes,
Chapter 135, Section 135.110 states, “[T]o the extent such credits
exceed the taxpayer’s Missouri tax on taxable business income,
[they] shall constitute an overpayment of taxes and in such case, be
refunded to the taxpayer provided such refunds are used by the tax-
payer to purchase specified facility items.” If the credits are sold,
the selling price must be at least 75 percent of the face value. This
seemed like a minor constraint, however, which is why we consider
the credit to be freely transferable.To illustrate, we recently obtained data on all
transactions from 2002-06 for the historic preser-
vation, neighborhood preservation, and brownfield
(remediation) credits.26 As Table 5 shows, they all
sell for about 10 cents (per dollar) below face value.
Many factors contribute to the discount on the
tax credits. For arm’s length transactions, the pur-
chaser of the credit would take into account the
competitive return on other uses of her capital. This
in turn would depend on how long she expects
her capital to be tied up in the investment, the
riskiness of the investment, and the true net-of-tax
return. As many people with whom we spoke
emphasized, the tax consequences of transacting
and using the credits is particularly important in
evaluating the discount. For example, the profit
from purchasing tax credits at a discount and
then using them is itself taxable, and the use of
the credits also causes a taxpayer who itemizes and
pays ordinary income tax (as opposed to alterna-
tive minimum tax) to lose some of her federal
deduction for state taxes paid. Whether or not
these factors could explain the discount, especially
for short-term investments, is the subject of ongo-
ing research.
Refundability, especially when coupled with
transferability, is a reform that merits further
exploration. It is not without its critics, however.
Refundability is of no value to agents who need
immediate liquidity. For them, transferability is
essential. This is most likely for people using the
credits as part of the financing for large capital
projects. Also, refundability requires an extra
degree of cooperation from the government. The
state is relatively passive in allowing a taxpayer to
sell a credit and take a deduction. The state must
act in sending a refund. At least during a recession,
the holder of a tax credit who has no tax liability
may still want to sell it to someone who has tax
liability, even with a discount, if he believes the
state may delay paying the refund.27 At the very
least, these points make it clear that refundability
should be considered in conjunction with trans-
ferability and not as a substitute for it.
CONCLUSIONS
One theme we have emphasized throughout
the analysis is that, before one considers the spe-
cific goals of a program, one must understand why
a program is needed at all. Is there something inef-
ficient or unfair about the outcomes that would
result if the program did not exist? Specific goals
that exist without a careful analysis of this basic
question are likely to be arbitrary and inconsistent.
We pose this basic question for each of the six
largest programs (by value of credits issued in 2005)
that issued “freely” transferable credits and see
where it leads.
More precisely, we ask whether the program
addresses a market failure, corrects disparities or
inequities, or promotes economic development.
We then see how these questions relate to program
design and evaluation.
26 Transactions prices for the affordable housing credit are not avail-
able; there seems to have been only one transaction of the business
facility credit (which is also refundable); and data on the infrastruc-
ture tax credit is still being prepared for us.
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Table 5
Transactions Prices for Tax Credits
Average
Program Observations sale price per dollar Standard deviation Average transaction
Historic preservation 3,624 90 cents 5 cents $178,622
Brownfield (remediation) 816 91 cents 6 cents 137, 442
Neighborhood preservation 1,322 87 cents 9 cents 28,658
27 It has also been suggested to us that refundable tax credit payments
count toward the annual constitutional spending limits in Missouri
(the Hancock Amendment) and that recent rulings by the IRS may
eliminate income recognition for transferable credits. Evaluating
these claims is outside the scope of our analysis here.This brings us to our second theme. It is a
thankless (and flawed) task to evaluate every pro-
gram as if its purpose were economic development.
Different goals imply different structural features
for the programs. They also require the measure-
ment of somewhat different variables for proper
evaluation. To evaluate a program that corrects an
externality, one must gather some information
about that externality. To evaluate a program that
corrects disparities or inequities, one must talk
explicitly about who gains from the program and
who loses from the state spending that will be
reduced because of the tax revenue forgone as a
result of the program.
Third, we emphasize the need for analysis.
Lists of raw data about the impact of a policy are
not the same thing as evaluation. A proper evalua-
tion develops a single, bottom-line number of all
tangible net benefits or costs. This is the only way
to set up a rational and informed debate over the
subjective or intangible benefits and costs of a
program.
In closing, it seems to us that proper program
evaluation simply cannot be done right now in
Missouri. The Department of Economic Develop-
ment has great expertise but fundamentally works
for whoever occupies the governor’s office. This
may explain their narrow focus, uniform approach,
and tendency to report data instead of conclusions.
The state auditor has the necessary independence
but lacks the expertise. Outside academics have
the expertise but lack the specialized knowledge
that accrues to people who evaluate public pro-
grams for a living. The state will have many, perhaps
even more, tax credit programs into the foreseeable
future. It ought to consider creating an organization,
perhaps akin to the Congressional Budget Office,
with the independence, expertise, and accumulated
knowledge that leads to the very best program
evaluation.
REFERENCES
Bartik, Tim. “Solving the Problems of Economic
Development Incentives.” Growth and Change,
Spring 2005, 36(2), pp. 139-66.
Missouri Department of Economic Development,
Incentives Review Committee. “Report on Missouri
Incentive Programs.” November 22, 2005;
www.ded.mo.gov/upload/
incentivesreviewreportnov22finala.pdf.
Missouri Department of Economic Development.
“Report on Missouri Tax Credits Administered by
the Department of Economic Development.” 2006.
Myers, Gordon. “Optimality, Free Mobility, and the
Regional Authority in a Federation.” Journal of
Public Economics, October 1990, 43(1), pp. 107-21.
Office of the State Auditor of Missouri, Claire McCaskill.
“Review of State Tax Credits Administered by the
Department of Economic Development.” Report No.
2001-13, February 23, 2001;
http://www.auditor.mo.gov/press/2001-13.pdf.
Phares, Don. “Examining Missouri’s Tax System: Tax
Expenditures—A First Step.” April 2003;
http://dor.mo.gov/tax/phares/.
Wildasin, David. “Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility:
Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy.” Journal
of Urban Economics, March 1989, 25(2), pp. 193-212.
Zodrow, George and Mieszkowski, Peter. “Pigou,
Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision
of Local Public Goods.” Journal of Urban Economics,
May 1986, 19(3), pp. 356-70.
Rothstein and Wineinger
68 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTRothstein and Wineinger
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 2007 69
APPENDIX
All Tax Programs, Sorted by Amount Issued, FY 2005
Alpha
code Name Authorization, RSMo. Transferable Refundable
LHC Missouri Low Income Housing 135.350 to 135.363 Yes No
HPC Historic Preservation TCP 253.545 to 253.561 Yes No
EZC Enterprise Zone 135.200 to 135.270, 135.429 No Yes
IDC Infrastructure TCP 100.286(6) Yes No
RTC Brownfield Redevelopment Program (remediation) 447.700 to 447.718 Yes No
Certified Capital Companies (CAPCO) Program 135.500 to 135.529 Yes No
NAC Neighborhood Assistance 32.100 to 32.125 No No
Missouri Health Insurance Pool 376.975 No No
AHC Affordable Housing Assistance TCP 32.105 to 32.125 Yes No
BFC New and Expanded Business Facility Credit 135.100 to 135.150, 135.258 Yes Yes
BUC BUILD (Missouri Business Use Incentives 100.700 to 100.850 No Yes
for Large-Scale Development)
Examination Fee Tax Credits (exam) 148.400 No No
Missouri Property and Casualty Guaranty Association 375.774 No No
RCN Neighborhood Preservation Tax Credit 135.475 to 135.487 Yes No
YOC Youth Opportunities 135.460 and 620.1100 to 620.1103 No No
NEC New Enterprise Creation 620.635 to 620.653 Yes No
NGC New Generation Cooperative Incentive 348.430 Yes No
TDC Transportation Development 135.545 Yes No
DPC Development Tax Credit 32.110 to 32.125 Yes No
APU Agricultural Product Utilization Contributor 348.430 Yes No
RCC Rebuilding Communities 135.535 Yes No
BJI Brownfield“Jobs and Investment” 447.700 to 447.718 No At DED
discretion
MHC Maternity Home 135.600 No No
BEC Bond Enhancement/Bond Guarantee 100.297 Yes No
DVC Shelter for Victims of Domestic Violence 135.550 No No
SBI Small Business Incubator 620.495 Yes No
WGC Wine and Grape Production 135.700 No No
CPC Charcoal Producers 135.313 Yes No
SBG Small Business Guaranty Fees/Loan Guarantee Fee 135.766 No No
Examination Fee Tax Credits (valuation) 148.400 No No
Examination Fee Tax Credits (registration) 148.400 No No
FDA Family Development Account 208.750 to 208.775 No No
DTC Brownfield (demolition) 447.700 to 447.718 No No
CBC Community Bank Investment/Community 135.400 to 135.430 Yes No
Development Corporation
DRC Development Reserve 100.25 Yes No
DFH Dry Fire Hydrant 320.093 Yes No
EFC Export Finance 100.25 Yes No
FPC Film Production 135.750 Yes No
MQJ Missouri Quality Jobs 620.1875 to 620.1890 Yes Yes
SCC Missouri Business Modernization and Technology 348.300 to 348.318 Yes No
Missouri Life and Health Guaranty Association 376.745 No No
NEZ New Enhanced Enterprise Zone 135.1050 to 135.1075 Yes Yes
REC Qualified Research Expense/Research 620.1039 No No
SDT Skills Development Credit N/A Yes No
ISB Small Business Investment/Capital 135.400 to 135.429 Yes No
SMC Sponsorship and Mentoring Program 135.348 No No
SCT Shared Care 660.055 No No
BFT Bank Franchise Tax 148.064 No N/A
BTC Bank Tax Credit for S Corporation Shareholders 143.471 Yes No
Cellulose Casings 260.285 No No
DAC Disabled Access 135.490 No No
WEC Processed Wood Energy 135.300 Yes No
ATC Special Needs Adoption 135.325 Yes NoRothstein and Wineinger
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APPENDIX, cont’d
All Tax Programs, Sorted by Amount Issued, FY 2005
Name Carry forward Carry back Multi-year
Missouri Low Income Housing 53 10
Historic Preservation TCP 10 3
Enterprise Zone 00
Infrastructure TCP 50
Brownfield Redevelopment Program (remediation) 20 0
Certified Capital Companies (CAPCO) Program Until used 0
Neighborhood Assistance 50
Missouri Health Insurance Pool Until used No
(excess over tax liability)
Affordable Housing Assistance TCP 10 0
New and Expanded Business Facility Credit 10 0
BUILD (Missouri Business Use Incentives 00
for Large-Scale Development)
Examination Fee Tax Credits (exam) 50
Missouri Property and Casualty Guaranty Association No No 3
Neighborhood Preservation Tax Credit 53
Youth Opportunities 50
New Enterprise Creation 10 0
New Generation Cooperative Incentive 53
Transportation Development 10 3
Development Tax Credit 50
Agricultural Product Utilization Contributor 53
Rebuilding Communities 53
Brownfield“Jobs and Investment” 00
Maternity Home 40
Bond Enhancement/Bond Guarantee 10 0
Shelter for Victims of Domestic Violence 40
Small Business Incubator 50
Wine and Grape Production 00
Charcoal Producers 70
Small Business Guaranty Fees/Loan Guarantee Fee 00
Examination Fee Tax Credits (valuation) 00
Examination Fee Tax Credits (registration) 00
Family Development Account 00
Brownfield (demolition) 20 0
Community Bank Investment/Community 10 0
Development Corporation
Development Reserve 50
Dry Fire Hydrant 70
Export Finance 50
Film Production 50
Missouri Quality Jobs 00
Missouri Business Modernization and Technology 10 0
Missouri Life and Health Guaranty Association No No 5
New Enhanced Enterprise Zone 00
Qualified Research Expense/Research 50
Skills Development Credit 50
Small Business Investment/Capital 10 3 (Distressed)
Sponsorship and Mentoring Program 40
Shared Care 00
Bank Franchise Tax 00 N/A
Bank Tax Credit for S Corporation Shareholders 40
Cellulose Casings 00
Disabled Access Unlimited 0
Processed Wood Energy 40
Special Needs Adoption 40Rothstein and Wineinger
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APPENDIX, cont’d
All Tax Programs, Sorted by Amount Issued, FY 2005
Federal
Name Cap type Cap amount deductions
Missouri Low Income Housing Annual Yes
(100% of federal LIHTC)
Historic Preservation TCP None Yes
Enterprise Zone None No
Infrastructure TCP Annual, flexible 10,000,000 No
Brownfield Redevelopment Program (remediation) None No
Certified Capital Companies (CAPCO) Program 10-year cumulative None
Neighborhood Assistance Annual 18,000,000 No
Missouri Health Insurance Pool Total of pool None
Affordable Housing Assistance TCP Annual 11,000,000 Yes
New and Expanded Business Facility Credit None No
BUILD (Missouri Business Use Incentives Annual 15,000,000 No
for Large-Scale Development)
Examination Fee Tax Credits (exam) Total of pool None
Missouri Property and Casualty Guaranty Association Total of pool None
Neighborhood Preservation Tax Credit Annual 16,000,000 No
Youth Opportunities Annual 6,000,000 No
New Enterprise Creation Cumulative 20,000,000 No
New Generation Cooperative Incentive Annual 6,000,000 No
Transportation Development Annual 10,000,000 No
Development Tax Credit Annual 6,000,000 No
Agricultural Product Utilization Contributor Annual 6,000,000 No
Rebuilding Communities Annual 8,000,000 No
Brownfield“Jobs and Investment” None No
Maternity Home Annual 2,000,000 N/A
Bond Enhancement/Bond Guarantee Cumulative 50,000,000 No
Shelter for Victims of Domestic Violence Annual 2,000,000 None
Small Business Incubator Annual 500,000 No
Wine and Grape Production None No
Charcoal Producers None 0 N/A
Small Business Guaranty Fees/Loan Guarantee Fee None No
Examination Fee Tax Credits (valuation) Total of pool None
Examination Fee Tax Credits (registration) Total of pool None
Family Development Account Annual 4,000,000 No
Brownfield (demolition) None No
Community Bank Investment/Community Cumulative 6,000,000 No
Development Corporation
Development Reserve None None No
Dry Fire Hydrant Annual 500,000 No
Export Finance None None No
Film Production Annual 1,500,000 No
Missouri Quality Jobs Annual 12,000,000 No
Missouri Business Modernization and Technology Cumulative 9,000,000 No
Missouri Life and Health Guaranty Association Total of pool None
New Enhanced Enterprise Zone Annual 4,000,000 No
Qualified Research Expense/Research Annual 10,000,000 No
Skills Development Credit Annual 6,000,000 N/A
Small Business Investment/Capital Cumulative 13,000,000 No
Sponsorship and Mentoring Program Appropriation 0 None
Shared Care None N/A
Bank Franchise Tax None No
Bank Tax Credit for S Corporation Shareholders None No
Cellulose Casings Appropriation No
Disabled Access None Yes
Processed Wood Energy None No
Special Needs Adoption Annual YesRothstein and Wineinger
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All Tax Programs, Sorted by Amount Issued, FY 2005
Fiscal year 2005
Total
Name Authorized Issued Redeemed outstanding
Missouri Low Income Housing 183,106,160 83,477,412 65,392,601 156,095,405
Historic Preservation TCP 116,566,180 80,213,374 74,532,355 61,343,552
Enterprise Zone 39,066,023 39,066,023 25,294,754 0
Infrastructure TCP 10,398,000 28,964,274 25,953,799 37,308,093
Brownfield Redevelopment Program (remediation) 15,515,319 14,808,297 10,627,870 4,180,427
Certified Capital Companies (CAPCO) Program 14,000,000 14,000,000 13,429,309 45,440,744
Neighborhood Assistance 16,000,000 11,263,385 9,286,880 14,000,000
Missouri Health Insurance Pool 10,015,203 10,015,203 6,121,053 9,066,945
Affordable Housing Assistance TCP 11,000,000 9,133,829 7,702,860 15,000,000
New and Expanded Business Facility Credit 8,779,797 8,779,797 4,546,330 3,085,774
BUILD (Missouri Business Use Incentives 7,842,167 8,419,707 3,770,557 4,649,150
for Large-Scale Development)
Examination Fee Tax Credits (exam) 7,576,530 7,576,530 2,650,135 5,703,974
Missouri Property and Casualty Guaranty Association 7,227,710 7,227,710 5,965,556 1,998,707
Neighborhood Preservation Tax Credit 13,609,190 6,784,310 8,641,503 6,824,880
Youth Opportunities 6,438,159 4,476,005 3,211,185 5,000,000
New Enterprise Creation 0 4,212,752 2,504,561 7,155,490
New Generation Cooperative Incentive 6,000,000 3,915,000 3,334,935 6,749,210
Transportation Development 6,682,249 3,226,568 3,545,219 7,000,000
Development Tax Credit 5,591,000 2,866,000 2,487,152 6,762,264
Agricultural Product Utilization Contributor 6,000,000 2,081,343 1,639,540 4,593,008
Rebuilding Communities 6,970,463 1,736,701 1,694,006 1,955,245
Brownfield“Jobs and Investment” 406,273 1,646,927 1,726,687 0
Maternity Home 953,987 953,987 743,635 N/A
Bond Enhancement/Bond Guarantee 870,275 870,275 594,034 276,241
Shelter for Victims of Domestic Violence 2,000,000 648,618 515,034 1,251,032
Small Business Incubator 500,000 361,913 246,807 384,983
Wine and Grape Production 313,683 313,683 179,323 0
Charcoal Producers 146,606 146,606 70,151 575,597
Small Business Guaranty Fees/Loan Guarantee Fee 103,591 103,591 11,224 0
Examination Fee Tax Credits (valuation) 35,000 35,000 12,000 23,000
Examination Fee Tax Credits (registration) 24,430 24,430 24,430 0
Family Development Account 780,000 7,625 12,875 4,000
Brownfield (demolition) 00 0 0
Community Bank Investment/Community 00 2,021,628 1,250,000
Development Corporation
Development Reserve 00 0 0
Dry Fire Hydrant 00 17,228 65,000
Export Finance 00 0 0
Film Production 1,500,000 0 322,079 752,705
Missouri Quality Jobs 00 0 0
Missouri Business Modernization and Technology 00 164,894 337,341
Missouri Life and Health Guaranty Association 00 0 0
New Enhanced Enterprise Zone 00 0 0
Qualified Research Expense/Research 00 1,626,864 5,823,761
Skills Development Credit 00 0 0
Small Business Investment/Capital 00 109,050 969,475
Sponsorship and Mentoring Program 854,443 00
Shared Care N/A N/A 0
Bank Franchise Tax N/A N/A 2,543,523 0
Bank Tax Credit for S Corporation Shareholders N/A N/A 941,460 N/A
Cellulose Casings N/A N/A 382,540 0
Disabled Access N/A N/A 56,761 N/A
Processed Wood Energy 3,348,890 N/A 3,700,285 N/A
Special Needs Adoption N/A N/A 2,578,354 N/ARothstein and Wineinger
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All Tax Programs, Sorted by Amount Issued, FY 2005
Name Special status
Missouri Low Income Housing
Historic Preservation TCP
Enterprise Zone Phasing out
Infrastructure TCP
Brownfield Redevelopment Program (remediation)
Certified Capital Companies (CAPCO) Program Cap reached
Neighborhood Assistance
Missouri Health Insurance Pool
Affordable Housing Assistance TCP
New and Expanded Business Facility Credit Phased out
BUILD (Missouri Business Use Incentives
for Large-Scale Development)
Examination Fee Tax Credits (exam)
Missouri Property and Casualty Guaranty Association
Neighborhood Preservation Tax Credit
Youth Opportunities
New Enterprise Creation Cap reached
New Generation Cooperative Incentive Cap is sum of both DOA tax credits
Transportation Development Expired
Development Tax Credit 6,000,000 cap only for FY 2005-07




Bond Enhancement/Bond Guarantee Cap remaining 48,812,870
Shelter for Victims of Domestic Violence Moved to DSS
Small Business Incubator
Wine and Grape Production
Charcoal Producers Expired
Small Business Guaranty Fees/Loan Guarantee Fee
Examination Fee Tax Credits (valuation)
Examination Fee Tax Credits (registration)
Family Development Account
Brownfield (demolition)
Community Bank Investment/Community Cap reached
Development Corporation
Development Reserve Issued from account, no accounts opened
Dry Fire Hydrant Expired
Export Finance Issued from account, no accounts opened
Film Production
Missouri Quality Jobs Starts FY 2006, and cap set at 7,000,000
Missouri Business Modernization and Technology Cap reached
Missouri Life and Health Guaranty Association None since 1998
New Enhanced Enterprise Zone Starts FY 2006
Qualified Research Expense/Research Expired
Skills Development Credit Repealed after no one used it
Small Business Investment/Capital Cap reached
Sponsorship and Mentoring Program Not funded
Shared Care
Bank Franchise Tax




Special Needs Adoption Outstanding N/A, DNR authorizes, Department of Revenue
redeems no cross checkRothstein and Wineinger
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All Tax Programs, Sorted by Amount Issued, FY 2005
Name Missouri agency
Missouri Low Income Housing Housing Development Commission
Historic Preservation TCP Department of Economic Development
Enterprise Zone Department of Economic Development
Infrastructure TCP Development Finance Board
Brownfield Redevelopment Program (remediation) Department of Economic Development
Certified Capital Companies (CAPCO) Program Department of Economic Development
Neighborhood Assistance Department of Economic Development
Missouri Health Insurance Pool Department of Insurance
Affordable Housing Assistance TCP Missouri Housing Development Commission
New and Expanded Business Facility Credit Department of Economic Development
BUILD (Missouri Business Use Incentives Development Finance Board
for Large-Scale Development)
Examination Fee Tax Credits (exam) Department of Insurance
Missouri Property and Casualty Guaranty Association Department of Insurance
Neighborhood Preservation Tax Credit Department of Economic Development
Youth Opportunities Department of Economic Development
New Enterprise Creation Department of Economic Development
New Generation Cooperative Incentive Agricultural and Small Business Development Authority
Transportation Development Department of Economic Development
Development Tax Credit Department of Economic Development
Agricultural Product Utilization Contributor Agricultural and Small Business Development Authority
Rebuilding Communities Department of Economic Development
Brownfield“Jobs and Investment” Department of Economic Development
Maternity Home Department of Social Services
Bond Enhancement/Bond Guarantee Department of Economic Development
Shelter for Victims of Domestic Violence Department of Public Safety
Small Business Incubator Department of Economic Development
Wine and Grape Production Department of Economic Development
Charcoal Producers Department of Natural Resources
Small Business Guaranty Fees/Loan Guarantee Fee Department of Economic Development
Examination Fee Tax Credits (valuation) Department of Insurance
Examination Fee Tax Credits (registration) Department of Insurance
Family Development Account Department of Economic Development
Brownfield (demolition) Department of Economic Development
Community Bank Investment/Community Department of Economic Development
Development Corporation
Development Reserve Development Finance Board
Dry Fire Hydrant Department of Economic Development
Export Finance Development Finance Board
Film Production Department of Economic Development
Missouri Quality Jobs Department of Economic Development
Missouri Business Modernization and Technology Department of Economic Development
Missouri Life and Health Guaranty Association Department of Insurance
New Enhanced Enterprise Zone Department of Economic Development
Qualified Research Expense/Research Department of Economic Development
Skills Development Credit Department of Economic Development
Small Business Investment/Capital Department of Economic Development
Sponsorship and Mentoring Program Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
Shared Care Department of Health, Division of Senior Services
Bank Franchise Tax Department of Revenue
Bank Tax Credit for S Corporation Shareholders Department of Revenue
Cellulose Casings Department of Revenue
Disabled Access Department of Revenue
Processed Wood Energy Department of Natural Resources
Special Needs Adoption Department of Revenue